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COMMENTS
Convertible Securities and Section 16 (b) : The Persistent
Problems of Purchase, _Sale, and Debts Previously Con•
tracted
In 1934, Congress enacted section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act1 in an effort to counteract the evils flowing from speculation in corporate securities by certain persons having information
regarding the corporation's affairs or occupying positions of trust
which permit manipulation of corporate policies.2 In general, section 16(b) permits the issuer, or one or more stockholders acting in
its behalf, to recover any "short-swing" profit realized from purchases and sales (or sales and purchases) of the issuer's equity securities within a six-month period by directors,8 officers, 4 or beneficial
owners of more than ten per cent of any class of equity securities.is
Once these statutory conditions ar~ satisfied, it is irrelevant that the
insider did not actually make use of privileged information° or, indeed, that he sold his stock for the corporation's benefit and at its
request. 7
The incidence of section 16(b), however, is also highly restricted,
and it does not strip the corporate insider of all of his natural advantages. For instance, recovery is limited to transactions completed
within a six-month span. Thus, an insider utilizing privileged in•
formation may with impunity dispose of his securities one day after
1. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
2. The abuses which § 16(b) was designed to prevent were disclosed by an extcn•
sive investigation into stock exchange practices conducted by the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency. Sec Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 if 97 Before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess. pt. 15 (1934).
For a thorough discussion of the practices leading up to the enactment of § 16(b),
see Cook &: Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act (pt. I), 66
HARV. L. REV. 385 (1953); Rubin &: Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use
of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468 (1947); Yourd, Trading
in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MICH. L. REv. 133 (1939).
3. "The term 'director' means any director of a corporation or any person perform•
ing similar functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated." 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (1964).
4. "The term 'officer' means a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, comp•
troller, and any other person who performs for an issuer, whether incorporated or ·unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers."
SEC Reg. X-3B-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1964). Although the definition seems to be explicit, there is substantial disagreement among the authorities. See 2 Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1081-94 (2d ed. 1961).
5. See generally 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1100-08.
6. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 820
U.S. 751 (1943); text accompanying notes 84 and 85 infra.
7. See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Magida v. Continental
Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956).
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the expiration of the statutory period.8 Furthermore, there is no
attempt to cover situations where the insider "advises" his friends9
or exchanges tips with insiders in other companies,10 and the statute
does not actually prohibit the use of inside information in shortswing transactions; it simply takes -the profit out of such activity.11
Finally, the act contains an express exception which provides that
an insider is not liable for profits from short-swing transactions in
securities if the securities were "acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted." 12 In general, however, the
courts have construed section 16(b) very liberally, permitting recovery on the basis of somewhat nebulous, and even inconsistent, theories.18 The result has been that whenever an insider purchases and
sells the same or closely related equity securities within a six-month
period, liability for realized profits is almost automatic.14
The principal difficulty in applying section 16(b) is that of determining what Congress intended by the use of the terms "purchase"
and "sale." The statutory definitions are extremely sketchy, providing only that the term "purchase" includes "any contract to buy,
8. B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1964).
9. Earlier drafts of the insider-trading provision had much broader coverage than
the language which now appears in § 16(b). Section 15(b) of both S. 2693 and H.R.
7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), provided: "It shall be unlawful for any director,
officer, or [beneficial owner of five per cent of any class of stock] .•• (3) To disclose,
directly or indirectly, any confidential information regarding or affecting any such
registered security•••• Any profit made by any person, to whom such unlawful disclosure shall have been made, in respect of any transaction • • • within a period not
exceeding 6 months after such disclosure shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer unless such person shall have had no reasonable ground to believe that the
disclosure was confidential••••" This sweeping forfeiture provision was apparently
omitted from the final act because of anticipated problems of administration. See
Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1952); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
10. Cf. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414-23 (1962) (dissenting opinion). See Cole,
Insiders' Liabilities Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147, 150
n.22 (1958); Comment, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 500 (1962); Note, 14 STAN. L. REv. 192, 199
(1961).
11. Denial of profit to insiders is imposed as an administrative sanction and not
upon any theory that such profits belong to the corporation by reason of a property
right. See Brudney, Insider Securities Dealings During Corporate Crises, 61 MICH. L.
R.Ev. I, 7 (1962). Moreover, § 16(b) is considered to be prophylactic rather than penal.
See .Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961
(1965); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959). But see Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 MICH. L. R.Ev. 649, 650 (196.4), where the author points
out that since recoveries are maximized wherever possible, the statute has acquired
quasi-penal overtones.
12. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
13. See .Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 961 (1965); Halleran &: Calderwood, Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution
of and Trading in Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 86, 114 (1959); Painter, supra
note 11, at 650.
14. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943); 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1043; Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 510, 513
(1950); Note, 107 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 719, 721 (1959).
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purchase, or otherwise acquire" 15 and that the term "sale" includes
"any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of" a security.10 Since
many types of transactions are ne_ither clearly within nor clearly
without the contemplation of this vague statutory language, section
16(b) is regarded as one of the most ambiguous provisions of all the
New Deal securities legislation.17
There has been considerable litigation concerning the proper
construction of these terms in various types of specialized securities
transactions. The principal areas of confusion have developed in
connection with receipt and exercise of warrants to purchase stock,18
exercise of stock options granted in consideration of an insider's
services,19 exchange of stock pursuant to a corporate reorganization
or simplification,20 and, most significantly, conversion of preferred
stock or debentures into the issuer's common stock.21 Due primarily
to the large number of recent cases involving convertible securities,
the following effort to delineate the scope of section l 6(b) will be
undertaken in the context of conversion transactions. However,
all of the foregoing transactions are closely related, and thus it
would appear that the general principles underlying the broad concepts of "purchase" and "sale" should apply uniformly in all of
these situations.22
15. 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l3) (1964).
16. 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l4) (1964).
17. See Halleran & Caldenvood, supra note 13, at 114.
18. See Shaw v. Dreyfuss, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949);
Truncale v. Blumberg, 88 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd per curiam sub nom. Truncalc
v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 887
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
19. See Kornfeld v. Eaton, 327 F.2d 263 {2d Cir. 1964); Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d
689 (2d Cir. 1957); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 {2d Cir. 1954); Walct v. Jefferson
Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Perlman v.
Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32
(S.D.N.Y. 1950), afj'd per curiam, 190 F.2d 82 {2d Cir. 1951). See generally Halleran,
The Impact of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19!)1 on Restricted
Stock Options, 15 Bus. LAw. 158 (1959).
20. See Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
961 (1965); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954):
Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Blau v.
Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
21. See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v.
Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d
984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N,Y.
1965); Blau v. Lamb, 163 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Cf. Blau v. Max Factor &: Co.,
342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 180 (1965).
22. Cf. Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954);
Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954). As originally enacted, § 16(b)
applied only to securities which were registered on a national securities exchange.
However, the scope of the statute has been enlarged recently by the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1964 to encompass a large number of issuers whose securities arc
traded over the counter. 78 Stat. 565, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964). See Little, Practical
Implications of the Recent Federal Securities Legislation for the Over-the-Counter
Company, 10 PRAC. LAW. No. 7, at 43 (1964).
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I. THE

ELUSIVE MEANING OF "PURCHASE" AND

"SALE"

Corporate securities which may be exchanged, at the owner's
option, for a different class of securities ·of the same or an affiliated
corporation are considered to be convertible.23 Generally, convertible issues are reasonably secure investments, such as bonds or preferred stock, which provide a fixed return on capital.24 In contrast,
the underlying or "conversion" security is frequently common
stock, which is more speculative but offers a possibility for greater
future income and market appreciation. It is evident that, from the
standpoint of the investor, the attraction of a convertible issue is
based upon its combination of these two distinct factors-current
income and potential growth in value. The income feature, which
inheres in a convertible security by reason of its being a direct obligation of the issuer,25 is independent of the conversion privilege.
On the other hand, the opportunity for capital appreciation is a
concomitant of the right to convert to the underlying common
stock. With respect to the issuer, the presence in a convertible security of the two elements of income and capital appreciation enables
it to obtain a greater market price for an issue than otherwise
would be possible without the conversion feature. 26 Thus, convertible securities are in effect a device which permits the issuer to acquire present capital in return for the purchaser's right to participate in future profits.

A. Early Developments .and Overly Broad Statements of the Law
The application of section 16(b) to cases involving convertible
securities is made difficult by the fact that an insider who acquires
such a holding also has a real interest in the underlying stock.27
If, for example, the market price of the underlying stock rises above
the conversion price, the value of the convertible security increases
proportionately. Conversely, if the market price of the underlying
stock declines, the price of the convertible security is correspondingly reduced until it reaches a level where it is supported. by its
inherent qualities as a bond or preferred stock.28 Indeed, as long
23. See generally 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 256 (5th ed. 1953);
Hills, Convertible Securities-Legal Aspects and Draftsmanship, 19 CALIF. L. REY. 1
(1930).
24. 1 DEWING, op. cit. supra note 23, at 256-58.
25. Id. at 269.
26. Id. at 268.
27. See Falco v. Donner Foundation, Inc., 208 F.2d 600, 603 (2d Cir. 1953), where
the court stated in dictum: "for all practical purposes a convertible bond is equivalent
to the number of shares of stock into which it is convertible." See generally Cook &
Feldman, supra note 2, at 624; Note, 72 HAR.v. L. REY. 1392, 1394 (1959); Note, 59
HARV. L. 'REV. 998, 999 (1946).
28. See generally 1 DEWING, op. cit. supra note ·23. Cf. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259
F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
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as the conversion privilege remains viable and the price of the underlying stock exceeds the conversion price, the value of the convertible
security is determined by the market valuation placed upon the
conversion security.29 Thus, in the absence of market manipulation
or similar unconscionable activity, it would appear that an insider
can achi~ve no greater speculative advantage by converting his
debentures or preferred stock and selling the underlying common
stock than by pursuing the direct course of disposing of the convertible security itself. Nevertheless, the courts have expressed
widely divergent, and somewhat irreconcilable, views on the subject
of short-swing conversions and sales by insiders.
The first major court of appeals decision to consider the implications of the foregoing interrelationship between convertible and
conversion securities in the context of section 16(b) was Park b
Tilford v. Schulte. 30 The defendants owned both a majority of the
outstanding common st~ck and 6,604 shares of convertible preferred,
which, unlike the common, was not listed on a securities exchange.
The preferred was redeemable on ninety days' notice at a price of
fifty-five dollars per share, with the holder having a right to exercise
his conversion privilege any time before the final redemption date.
In December 1943 the corporation gave notice that the preferred
was to be redeemed. However, from the latter part of 1943 until
May 1944 the market price of the common underwent a spectacular
rise because of a rumor that the issuer was about to declare a dividend in kind (liquor) on its common stock. During January 1944
the defendants exercised their conversion right, and within six
months they sold the common stock thus acquired for prices as high
as ninety-eight dollars per share.
The issuing corporation instituted an action to recover the shortswing profits. The district court allowed recovery, and its decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Without even discussing the possibilities for abuse of confidential information in the context of this particular transaction, the court stated:
We think a conversion of preferred into common stock
followed by a sale within six months is a "purchase and sale"
within the statutory language of § 16(b). Whatever doubt
might otherwise exist as to whether a conversion is a "purchase"
is dispelled by definition of "purchase" to include "any contract
to buy, purchase, or othenvise acquire." . . . Defendants did
not own the common stock in question before they exercised
their option to convert; they did afterward. Therefore they
acquired the stock, within the meaning of the Act.31
29. Ferraiolo v. Newman, supra note 28, at 345.
30. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. '761 (194'7).
31. Id. at 98'7. Although the decision is generally regarded as correct in relation
to the particular facts before the court, the opinion bas received frequent criticism
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This approach to the definitional problem, termed the strict or allinclusive view,82 clearly indicates an intent to give the broadest possible construction to the terms "purchase" and "sale," and eliminates
any possibility of discretionary administration of a statute which is
designed to obviate all incentive to abuse inside information.83
Other courts, however, confronted with different fact situations,
soon found that the sweeping language of the opinion required
modification.34 The inroads upon the broad generalizations found
throughout the Park &- Tilford opinion eventually culminated in
the Sixth Circuit decision of Ferraiolo v. Newman.35 In that case,
the court held that the receipt of common stock of the Ashland Oil
and Refining Company in exchange for its convertible preferred
was not a "purchase." Park &- Tilford was distinguished on several
grounds. First, Judge Potter Stewart pointed out that whereas the
defendants in Park &- Tilford were in actual control of the corporation, the defendant director in Ferraiolo assumed only a passive role
in corporate affairs. Judge Stewart concluded from this that the conversion of the Ashland preferred had been genuinely forced by the
board of directors, by means of a call for redemption made at a
time when the price of the common (and consequently the preferred
as well) substantially exceeded the call price. Second, the court emphasized the fact that the Ashland convertible preferred, as well as
the common, was listed and actively traded. Third, unlike the situation in Park &- Tilford, the conversion privilege attached to the
Ashland preferred could not be diluted36 by a stock split or stock
dividend which would increase the number of common shares. On
the basis of these factors, the court concluded that the effect of
Ashland's call of the preferred was simply to force the surrender of
the preference feature and that in reality the preferred and common
stocks of Ashland were "economic equivalents." In explaining its
decision, the court stated: "Newman's conversion of Ashland preferred to Ashland common had none of the economic indicia of a
for propounding an indefensibly broad rule. Most commentators feel that the decision
could have rested on the fact that the convertible preferred was closely held and
essentially nonmarketable, so that the conversion to common, which was readily
marketable, gave the defendants a real change in speculative opportunity. See 2 Loss,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 1067; Note, 36 U. DET. L.J. 343, 346 (1959). But see Note, 59
HARV. L. REv. 998 (1946).
32. See Note, 49 IowA L. REv. 1346, 1350 (1964); Comment, 11 STAN. L. REv. 358, 359
(1959).
33. See Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider Lia•
bilities Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949 (1959); Comment, 11 STAN. L. REv.
358 (1959).
34. For a detailed account of subsequent developments, see Cole, supra note 10, at
161.
35. 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
36. For an explanation of the term "dilution" in the context of securities transactions, see. note 46 infra and accompanying text.

480

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 64:474

purchase; it created no opportunity for profit which had not existed
since 1948. The transaction was not one that could have lent itself
to the practices which Section 16(b) was enacted to prevent." 87

B. Recent Developments
Despite the numerous distinctions between the Ashland and
Park & Tilford preferred stock and the dissimilar circumstances of
the exchange of those securities for the underlying common stock,
the Ferraiolo decision was widely acclaimed as having rejected any
application of the Park rb- Tilford doctrine beyond the specific facts
of that case.118 While the Second Circuit has not had any opportunity
to re-examine its prior reasoning, at least two of that court's recent
opinions indicate that it still regards the sweeping rule in Park rbTilford as an accurate statement of the law in cases involving convertible securities.89 In contrast, however, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit recently cited Ferraiolo with approval and held
that where an issuer's common and convertible class A stocks were
equally marketable and both securities were traded at precisely the
same price, a conversion would not be a "purchase" of the common
within the meaning of section 16(b).40
In the most recent case involving this interpretative controversy,
Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 41 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit was presented with factors similar to those relied upon by
the defendants in both Park rb- Tilford and Ferraiolo. On November
20, 1958, defendant Webster, a director of Heli-Coil, acquired debenture bonds which were convertible into the common stock of
the plaintiff corporation at the option of the bondholder. About
three months later, the investment banking firm that advised the
issuer on financial matters suggested to the defendant that he convert
37. 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959), As in the
case of the language in Park & Tilford, this statement has also been criticized for
being overly broad. See, e.g., Meeker &: Cooney, supra note 33; Comment, 11 STAN. L,
REv. 358 (1959); Note, 107 u. PA. L. REV. 719 (1959).
38. See, e.g., Note, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1392, 1394 (1959); Note, 36 U, DET. L.J. 848,
347 (1959).
39. In the first of these two cases, Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir, 1960),
afj'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), the defendant's partnership had acquired common stock,
exchanged it for a new preferred issue pursuant to a voluntary recapitalization plan,
and then sold the preferred-all within six months. In order to compute the amount
of profit realized by the defendant partner, it was necessary to determine the purchase
date. After citing Park & Tilford, Judge Medina held that the "purchase" occurred
on the date of conversion. Id. at 792. In the second case, Judge Kaufman stated that
"it is clear that a conversion of preferred into common is a purchase within the
meaning of § 16(b)," but no liability resulted, because of failure to show any realization of profit. B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1964).
40. Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 86 Sup, Ct. 180
(1965).
41. 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965). The district court decision is discussed in Note, 49
IOWA L, REv. 1346 (1964),
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his debentures, since the ·elimination of this indebtedness would
"make a better statement." For this reason, and because he needed
cash for personal expenses, on March 18, 1959, defendant voluntarily
exercised his privilege to convert. Subsequently, within six months
of the conversion date, but more than six months after acquiring
the bonds, he sold common stock at a profit. During the entire eightmonth period in question, the market price of Heli-Coil common
was constantly rising, a trend which continued throughout 1959.
Although the court conceded that the common stock was the economic equivalent of the debentures and that it was difficult to perceive how Webster could have obtained an economic advantage
from the conversion,42 it concluded that conversions should be controlled by a strict "rule of thumb." It therefore held the exchange
to be a "sale" 43 of the debentures and a "purchase" of the stock.

C. Fine Lines of Distinction
The failure of the courts to articulate the basic rationale underlying their decisions in the conversion cases has left this area of the
law in a state of confusion. This outward appearance is made more
disturbing because of the fact that, after the Park & Tilford decision,
there has been general agreement on the test of ·liability, as stated
in Ferraiolo: "Every transaction which can reasonably be defined as
a purchase will be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which
can possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by section
16(b)."44 Thus, although the statute explicitly proscribes any inquiry as to whether an insider is acting upon confidential information, it is equally clear that the foregoing test of liability requires
an investigation into the facts of a questioned transaction to see
whether confidential information could be utilized to the detriment
of outside shareholders. In this respect, it appears that the Heli-Coil
opinion has departed from the precedent established by earlier decisions under section 16(b) and has also disregarded the realities of
that particular case, since there was no showing of circumstances
which would have made it possible for the defendant to exploit h_is
position as an insider. In contrast, all of the earlier opinions dealing
with short-swing conversion transactions have devoted considerable
attention to the effect of one or more of the following factors:
42. Id. at 164-65.
43. Heli-Coil was the first decision to hold that a conv~rsion was a "sale" as well
as a "purchase." Subsequently this view was adopted in Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp.
151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
44. 259 F.2d at 345. Accord, Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 180 (1965); Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1960),
aff'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); HellCoil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831, 835 (D.N.J. 1963), aff'd, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir.
1965).

482

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 64:474

whether the convertible .issue is subject to dilution by an increase
in the number of underlying common shares, whether the convertible and conversion securities are equally marketable, and whether
the conversion was "forced" by a corporate redemption of the convertible issue. None of these three factors is conclusive with respect
to the question of liability, but all should nevertheless be examined
to determine whether there is any way an insider could have misused privileged information.

I. Dilution
In the absence of any factors which would tend to create a
greater market demand for the conversion security than for the convertible security, and thereby produce a concomitant differential
in price, it seems evident that in most situations there is no possible speculative advantage to be achieved by a conversion and subsequent sale of the underlying common stock.45 Therefore, under
Ferraiolo's "any possibility of abuse" test, it is relevant to consider
whether the intermediate conversion itself might produce such a
change in the economic position of the security holder that he could
be regarded as having taken a profit on his investment.
In this respect, it should be noted that if the convertible security
is not protected by an anti-dilution provision, it may be possible,
in certain circumstances, for an insider with knowledge of the corporation's affairs to effect a conversion which will substantially improve his economic position. Protection against dilution ensures a
constant conversion ratio between a convertible security and the
underlying common stock.46 If the number of outstanding common
shares is altered, the number of common shares for which one convertible security may be exchanged increases or decreases proportionally. For this reason, anti-dilution provisions are commonly incorporated in convertible debentures and shares of convertible
preferred stock.47 In the absence of such protection for the holders
of convertible securities, it is obvious that inside knowledge that a
stock split or stock dividend is imminent would present an opportunity for abuse since insiders could conver~ their holdings prior
to the split or the date of record for the dividend, and thus participate in the increase in the number of common shares.
Similarly, there is one additional situation in which a holder of
a dilutable issue of convertible securities might profit, even without
the advantage of inside information, by converting and selling the
45. See .Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 86
Sup. Ct. 180 (1965).
46. See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 859
U.S. 927 (1959).
47. See, e.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Ferraiolo v,
Newman, supra note 46.
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underlying common stock. If a convertible security does not contain
an anti-dilution provision, it continually bears an overhanging
threat that its value will be impaired by an increase in the supply
of the conversion security. Although the effects of arbitrage48 will
normally prevent wide differences in price unfavorable to a dilutable issue, rumors of an impending split or stock dividend may
nevertheless result in temporary differentials between the market
prices of the two types of securities. The uncertainty as to the record
date would cause most investors to be reluctant to purchase the
convertible issue with a view toward conversion, but persons who
already owned the convertible securities would be in a position to
obtain a small profit by quickly converting and selling the more
favored common stock.
In Ferraiolo, however, the court observed that the Ashland preferred was protected against dilution and was in that respect a mere
substitute for the common into which it was convertible.49 This
theory was also vigorously relied upon by the defendant in HeliCoil, since his convertible debentures contained a similar anti-dilution clause. Nevertheless, this indicium of the economic equivalence
of the Heli-Coil common and debentures was completely ignored
by the court. However, it would appear that since the He~i-Coil
debentures were readily salable and fully protected against dilution,
their market price would continue to be reflected accurately in the
price of the common. Thus, since conversion of the non-dilutable
debentures could not have produced a significant change in the economic position of the defendant bondholder, and since conversion
offered no greater opportunity for. profit than would a sale o~ the
debentures themselves, the act of converting should not have been
regarded as a "sale" of the convertible security or as a "purchase"
of the underlying common stock.
2. Marketability

Many critics of the s,v-eeping statements in the Park & Tilford
opinion have suggested that the decision is at least correct on its own
facts, since the convertible preferred was closely held and not readily marketable in the sense that it was not listed on an exchange
or othenv-ise actively traded. 50 In an active market, convertible securities and the underlying common stock are normally traded at iden48. The term "arbitrage" refers to a specialized form of trading which is based
upon disparities in quoted prices of the same or practically equivalent commodities and
securities. By virtue of one form of such trading-kind arbitrage-the price disparity
disappears as purchases of convertible securities are offset against sales of the conversion security. See Falco v. Donner Foundation, Inc., 208 F.2d 600, 603 (2d Cir. 1953); 2
Loss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1108 n.276.
49. See 259 F.2d at 345.
50. See note 31 supra.
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tical prices; 51 however, as the court in the Park & Tilford case noted,
the private placement of large blocks of closely held convertible
preferred stock is certain to have a depressing effect on its price.112
Although this adverse effect could be mitigated by spreading the
sales over a long period of time, such an approach would also involve the obvious risk that the demand for, and therefore the price
of, the underlying common might decline, thus reducing the value
of the convertible security as well. For this reason, the insiders in
Park & Tilford could engage in market speculation on a large scale
only after acquiring the underlying common, which was actively
traded on the New York Stock Exchange.63
The ease with which widely held, actively traded securities may
be sold in the market presents a compelling argument in favor of
the "economic equivalency" found in Ferraiolo, where both securities were equally marketable and were traded at identical prices. 114
In such circumstances, no speculative opportunity can be gained
by holding the common which does not also inhere in the possession
of the convertible preferred. Conversion in this situation is not a
liquidation of the original investment, but rather a deferment of
accrued profits. An insider can secure the same benefit by choosing not· to convert and instead selling his original (convertible)
securities. 55
Although the convertible debentures in Heli-Coil were unlisted,
the court proceeded upon the basis that they were, nevertheless,
actively traded over the counter.56 Relying on this fact and the precedent of Ferraiolo, the defendant asserted that his conversion created
no opportunity for new speculation.57 The court conceded the relevance of this argument but nevertheless felt bound to follow an
arbitrary rule of thumb that precluded all consideration of the circumstances underlying the transaction-even those which negated
the existence of an opportunity to use inside information. However,
since abuse of confidential information was the factor which
prompted the enactment of section 16(b), it appears that the court's
refusal to consider the equal marketability of the two Heli-Coil
51. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
52. 160 F.2d at 990.
53. In an effort to distinguish the Park b Tilford decision, the district court in the
Ferraiolo case pointed out that the Park rb Tilford speculators had "to have common
stock, which sold on the New York Stock Exchange, before they could hope to reap a
quick profit." Ashland Oil &: Ref. Co. v. Newman, 163 F. Supp. 506, 507 (N.D. Ohio
1957), afj'd sub nom. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958),
54. But see Meeker &: Cooney, supra note 33, at 963.
55. See Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 86
Sup. Ct. 180 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 927 (1959).
56. 352 F.2d at 156.
57. Brief for Appellant, pp. 10, 15-17, Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d
Cir. 1965).
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securities is inconsistent with its observation that the decision "must
tum on the basic purpose of the statute." 58
3. Motivation

Although the courts have devoted considerable attention to the
perplexing problem of whether anti-dilution provisions and ease of
marketability render two securities "economic equivalents," the
principal judicial concern has been in regard to the significance that
should be attributed to the element of volition in conversions and
similar transactions.59 The courts and commentators have generally
felt that when an insider converts his securities after an unanticipated call for redemption of the convertible security, the transaction
has in effect been "forced" by the corporate issuer, and therefore
no liability should be imposed under section 16(b).60 The fullest
development of this view appears in the Ferraiolo case, where the
conversion was clearly precipitated by the independent action of the
issuing corporation. The court observed that the defendant was
merely a passive director and that he was not in fact privy to any
inside information concerning the company. 61 Thus, he could not
have been expected to prevent or rescind the call of the convertible
preferred. Moreover, since the market price of Ashland common
was nine dollars above the redemption price of the convertible preferred, permitting their preferred stock to be redeemed was not. a
realistic alternative for the shareholders. The court conceded that
the defendant could have avoided the loss by outright sale of the
preferred on the open market, but stated that "it can hardly be said
that a failure to sell is tantamount to a purchase." 62
The wisdom of the court's conclusion in Ferraiolo that a forced
conversion should not be regarded as a sale is also supported by the
fact that when an insider is faced with an uncontrollable redemption
call for his convertible securities at a price below the prevailing
58. 352 F.2d at 164.
59. See, e.g., Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), afj'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962);
Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959);
Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Shaw v. Dreyfus,
172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160
F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Blau v. Lamb, 163 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Blau v. Hodgkinson,
100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
60. See, e.g., Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 927 (1959); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 761 (1947); Blau v. Lamb, 163 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); 2 Loss, op. dt. supra
note 4, at 1068; Note,. 72 HARV. L .. REv. 1392 (1959). But see the counterargument in
Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 1965); Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv.
719, 724 (1959).
61. See 259 F.2d at 344.
62. Id. at 346.
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market value of the underlying stock, conversion may be the only
alternative that does not represent a substantial detriment to him.
One example of this would be a situation in which an insider who
has received notice of a redemption call desires to maintain his
equity interest in the issuer. Obviously, the only two means by
which he could achieve his objective would be either to convert to
the underlying common stock (the course adopted by the defendant
in Ferraiolo) or to sell his convertible securities and then purchase
an equivalent amount of the company's stock in the market. It
should be noted, however, that the latter method may involve a
substantial risk of incurring liability under the act in a falling
market. In this respect, although section 16(b) is not concerned with
profits obtained from transactions in two independent classes of
securities issued by the same corporation,63 it is arguable that any
two issues of securities, such as convertibles and the underlying
common, which are so related as to afford a means of achieving inand-out trading profits, are included within the scope of the act. 64
On the basis of this reasoning, if an insider sells his convertible
securities to avoid the redemption and then repurchases the underlying security within six months at a lower market price, he would
be subject to liability, since the statute encompasses profits from
"sales and purchases" as well as "purchases and sales." 65 Thus, if an
insider were content with his investment in the issuer, it would be
unrealistic to expect him to sell his convertible securities with a
view toward immediately reacquiring a proportionate interest in
the conversion security.
Tax considerations offer a second basis for concluding that it
would be inequitable to require insiders, in order to avoid liability
under section 16(b), to sell convertible securities which have been
called for redemption. In this regard, it is evident that a forced sale
at a profit would necessitate payment of capital gains taxes 00 in the
year the redemption call is issued, thus depriving an insider of the
opportunity to incur tax liability at the time most convenient for
him. Indeed, the foregoing considerations are so compelling that in
the Ferraiolo case the owners of more than ninety-nine per cent of
the Ashland preferred elected to convert.67 Finally, from the standpoint of the issuer's own interests, holding that a truly forced conversion is subject to the provisions of section 16(b) might result in
63. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 237 n.13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 820
U.S. 751 (1943).
64. See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1059; Rubin & Feldman, supra note 2, at
486.

65. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
66. A subsidiary argument made by the defendant in Heli-Coil was that since conversion is not a taxable event, it should not be considered a "sale." Brief for Appellant, p. 6, Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
67. See 259 F.2d at 345.
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drying up a potential source of capital. If every conversion involved
both a purchase of the underlying common stock and a sale of the
convertible security, no insider could ever buy convertibles in the
market without assuming the risk that a forced conversion within,
the ensuing six months would render him liable for any profit
realized. 68
When the insider acts on his own volition, however, none of
these consequences are forced upon- him, and the courts have been
much more inclined to impose liability under section 16(b). For
instance, the defendants in the Park b Tilford case had argued that
since they converted in response to a redemption call, their act was
involuntary and could not have been motivated by privileged information. The court responded that any notion of a "forced" conversion was somewhat absurd in light pf the fact that the defendants'
control of the issuing corporation was so pervasive that they could
have prevented the passage of the redemption resolution. 69 Judge
Clark pointed out that the Schulte group had made a routine business decision as to the most profitable of the three possible courses
of action-redemption, conversion and sale of the underlying common stock, or outright sale of the convertible preferred70-but did
not offer any explanation as to how such conduct contravened the
objectives of the statute.
This somewhat mechanical approach to voluntary transactions
was also evidenced in Blau v. Hodgkinson. 71 The court concluded
that the receipt of stock in a parent corporation in exchange for
stock in a subsidiary pursuant to a plan of reorganization constituted
a "purchase" where the defendant insider had an option to receive
cash instead. The opinion clearly indicates that the exchange would
not have been subject to section 16(b) if the defendant had been
irrevocably bound to accept the parent corporation stock.72 The
broad implications of Park b Tilford are even more apparent in
Blau v. Lamb,78 in which the plaintiff attempted to match a conversion with a prior purchase of preferred stock. Although the judge
denied motions by both parties for summary judgment, he stated:
"I do not think that the defendants have established as a matter
of law that the conversi<;>n of their preferred into common was not
a sale. The fact remains that the conversion of the preferred was
voluntary and that the common which was acquired through the
conversion was publicly held." 74 In similar fashion, Judge Medina,
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1068.
160 F.2d at 988.
Ibid.
100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
Id. at 373.
163 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Id. at 533. In the subsequent trial of the issues, it was held that the conversion
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·writing the opinion in a recent Second Circuit case, concluded that
where an exchange of stock is "in all respects voluntary," the situation could lend itself to insider manipulation and to the making
of short-swing profits within the meaning of the statute. 711 Again,
no discussion was offered to explain the manner in which unfair
profits could be made in the context of this particular conversion
transaction.
Although the foregoing decisions largely fail to illuminate their
ratio decidendi, it is apparent that their accumulated impact is
substantial. Thus, when the district court in the Heli-Coil case emphasized the voluntary nature of the transaction76 and minimized
the defendant's argument that the securities in question were "economic equivalents," the decision was buttressed by considerable
authority.
Neverthelessi a voluntary exchange of securities does not automatically lead to liability. In Roberts v. Eaton77 the defendant insider, who owned 45.9 per cent of the outstanding common stock
of Old Town Corporation, requested and obtained stockholder approval to convert all of the corporation's stock into a more marketable form. The newly created securities were subsequently sold
within six months of the exchange. It was held that the combined
effect of full disclosure of the proposed reclassification, equal treatment of all stockholders,78 and maintenance of defendant's proportionate interest immediately after the transaction precluded the
possibility of unfair use of confidential information. The clear implication of the Eaton decision is that even in voluntary exchanges
the insider may be permitted to rid himself of liability, provided
he can marshal sufficient evidence negating any inference that the
transaction is an integral step in a scheme to exploit inside knowledge79 or to stimulate market activity. so
of preferred stock into common was a "sale." Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). In this decision, the court emphasized the fact that the transaction was completely voluntary. Id. at 157.
75. Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd without consideration
of this point, 368 U.S. 403 (1962). Accord, B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255,
258 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum).
76. See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831, 835 (D.N.J. 1963). On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit regarded the lack of compulsion in the
transaction as an element of "some importance," but the court preferred to rest its
decision on a "rule of thumb." 352 F.2d 156, 167 (3d Cir. 1965).
77. 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
78. Nonpreferential treatment was also considered to be an important factor in
the Ferraiolo case. See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959). But see Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 719, 723 (1959).
79. Cf. Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 86
Sup. Ct. 180 (1965).
80. Unusual market activities by insiders are regarded in the investment community as indications of management's appraisal of the corporation's future prospects and
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In summary, it appears that although the courts purport to be
strictly enforcing section 16(b) in all exchanges of stock, in practice
some courts have adopted a rebuttable presumption of liability
whenever the conversion is truly voluntary. Although the defendant's burden of proof is onerous, it is nevertheless possible to prevent "harsh and wooden results quite unnecessary to achieve the
purposes of the act." 81 However, it is evident from a comparison
of the results in Park & Tilford and Heli-Coil with those in Eaton
that to be persuasive, the exculpatory evidence must go to the peculiar circumstances of the transaction-such as full disclosure and
stockholder approval82-rather than a general theory of "economic
equivalence." Indeed, it must be conclusively demonstrated that
neither the other owners of the convertible securities nor the holders of the common stock have been injured by the conversion.83

D. Objective Measure of Proof
The language of section 16(b) clearly indicates that Congress
intended to permit recovery after short-swing transactions even
though an insider may have initially acquired his securities for longterm investment purposes, but was subsequently forced to sell because of changed circumstances.84 The need for this objective measure of proof was graphically illustrated by Thomas Corcoran, chief
spokesman for the proponents of the act, when he stated:
You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expec-tation to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will
be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of
thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having
can precipitate violent fluctuations in the price of the stock. See Meeker 8e Cooney,

supra note 33, at 978; C9mment, 69 YALE L.J. 868 (1960).
81. See Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016
(1954).
82. It should be noted, however, that stockholder approval alone will not overcome the presumption of unfairness associated with a conversion and quick sale
of the underlying security. Cf. Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956); Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
83. See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82, 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827
(1954); cf. Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907

QM~

,

84. "[A]ny profit realized by him [the insider] from any purchase and sale, or any
sale and purchase, of any equity security of •.. [the] issuer (other than an exempted
security) within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired
in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months."
48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
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to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to
get out on a short swing. 85
Although the "crude rule of thumb" was instituted for the limited
function of obviating the need to prove actual use of inside information, its purpose seems to have been misconstrued by the Third
Circuit in Heli-Coil. Indeed, the court felt that this inflexible rule
foreclosed all inquiry into facts indicating that it would have been
impossible for Webster to exploit inside knowledge. 80 The confusion
seems to stem from an assumption that the "rule of thumb" urged
by Mr. Corcoran and the "possibility of abuse" test adopted by the
courts are mutually exclusive concepts. However, the statutory history of the act makes it clear that the function of the "rule of
thumb'.' is merely to eliminate the prohibitory burden of establishing an insider's intent. The "possibility of abuse" test, on the other
hand, is related to the broader objective of determining whether
a particular transaction even permits the unfair use of inside information. It seems apparent that the remedial purpose of the act
would not be jeopardized by applying these concepts concurrently.87 Moreover, it is manifest that the mechanical approach of
holding an apparently innocuous conversion to be a purchase or
sale is largely a judicial technique to lengthen the six-month limitation period set forth in the statute. Thus, since the procedure of
converting preferred or debentures and then selling the underlying
security is merely an alternative method of disposing of the convertible security, the rule adopted in Heli-Coil had the effect of
penalizing the insider for doing indirectly what it was conceded he
could have done directly over the eight-month period which had
elapsed.88
II. THE Goon-FAITH DEBT EXCEPTION
A second aspect of section 16(b) that has received much less
attention than the elusive definitions of "purchase" and "sale" is
the·express exception for good-faith debts. Notwithstanding the fact
that profits have been realized from short-swing transactions, the
insider may still escape liability if the securities in question were
85. Hearings on S. Res. 81, and S. Res, 56 6- 97, supra note 2, at 6557.
86. See 352 F.2d at 164-65.
87. It should be noted that in addition to lacking support in the statute, the use
of the "rule of thumb" theory in Heli-Coil is also contrary to the expressions in other
recent conversion cases. For instance, Judge Medina recently stated that "while we
held the transaction not to be a 'purchase' in Roberts v. Eaton, ••• the same line
of reasoning was used. What was done in that case did not lend itself to the further•
ancc of the prohibited purpose. There is no rule of thumb; nor would it be wise to
attempt to formulate such a rule.'' Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1960),
affd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962). Accord, Blau v. Max Factor&: Co,, 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 180 (1965). But see 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 4 (Supp. 1962,
at 33).
88. Cf. Blau v. Max Factor&: Co., supra note 87, at 808-09.
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acquired in good faith in connection with an antecedent debt. 89
Whether the profits from a particular purchase and. sale qualify for
the exemption is essentially a question of the bona fides of the transaction.90 Thus, whereas the over-all design of section 16(b) is based
upon a strict objective measure of proof which proscribes all inquiry
into the intent underlying an insider's conduct,91 the good-faith
debt exception expressly incorporates a subjective standard which
permits an examination into the reason for accepting securities in
discharge of a debt. 92 For many years it was felt that this good-faith
test required a showing that it was absolutely necessary to take the
securities in payment.93 However, in a recent decision it was pointed
out that it would be unreasonable to interpret the statute as confining the exemption to unusual situations where there is a complete lack of choice on the part of the creditor.94 Instead, the element
of choice should simply be recognized as one of the factors to be
weighed in determining the insider's good faith. 95
A. Situations in Which the Exception Is Applicable
The debt exception constituted a minor point of construction in
• the early case of Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,96 where one defendant
insider acquired company stock which he used within a six-month
period to repay a debt owing to a second insider. Although the
phrase "acquired ... in connection with" seems to be broad enough
to encompass the payment of debts by delivering stock, the court
felt that the adoption of such an interpretation would defeat the
purpose of the exception, since profits otherwise recoverable under
the statute could be washed out by the simple expedient of borrowing money which could be repaid in appreciated stock.97 The court
therefore refused to apply the good-faith debt exception on behalf
of the first (debtor) insider, but, on the other hand, did hold that
the stock received by the second insider in satisfaction of a bona
fide debt could be disposed of at any time without liability.98 It is
89. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
90. See Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1961); Rubin 8e
Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair U~e of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468, 487 (1947).
91. See text accompanying notes 84 and 85 supra. ·
92. Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1961). See Note, 1962 DuKE
L.J. 589, 593; Note, 23 U. Pm. L. REv. 1020, 1021 (1962).
. 93. See Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (dictum);
Cook 8e Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L.
REv. 612, 632-33 (1953); Rubin 8e Feldman, supra note 90, at 487.
94. See Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1961).
95. Ibid.
96: 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
97. See id. at 239.
98. Ibid.
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obvious that a contrary interpretation would deprive the lender in
such a situation of the full benefit of repayment.
The only other decision which has applied the debt exception
is Rheem Manufacturing Co. v. Rheem/19 where the clause received
its most thorough consideration to date. Pursuant to the issuer's
retirement plan, which provided a choice among insurance, annuities, cash, and company stock, defendant Rheem elected to receive
his benefits in the form of stock. For accounting purposes, the company issued Rheem a check for the amount of his interest in the
plan, and he in tum gave his personal check for the number of
shares nearest in value to this interest. Shortly thereafter, he pledged
the shares with a bank to secure a prior debt. Just before the expiration of the six-month period following these transactions, the
pledgee bank began selling the shares through a broker in order to
liquidate the indebtedness. The court held that Rheem was not
liable for the profits realized from these sales, since his employer
had an unconditional obligation to pay a fixed sum quite apart from
the form of the settlement by the stock transfer.100
B. The Conversion Cases
In contrast to the foregoing decisions, insiders in conversion
cases have never succeeded in convincing the courts that a conversion
security was received in connection with an antecedent debt. In the
context of Park rb Tilford, this result is easily justified. Neither preferred stock nor a conversion clause in such stock in any way constitutes a debt obligation. Instead, the preferred merely represents an
interest in the equity and profits of the issuer, and the convertible
feature grants the holder an option to select one form of ownership
in lieu of another.101
The rationale of Park rb Tilford, however, does not necessarily
preclude application of the debt exception to convertible bonds,
which are, in fact, debt obligations of the issuing corporation. In
the Heli-Coil case, for example, the indenture agreement specifically
stated that the bonds constituted an unconditional promise on the
part of the issuing corporation to pay a definite sum of money, plus
annual interest of five per cent.102 Thus, when the bonds were converted and the underlying common stock acquired, the issuer's debt
obligation to the defendant was extinguished.
99. 295 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1961). The case is discussed in Note, 1962 DUKE L.J. 589;
23 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1020 (1962).
100. 295 F.2d at 476.
IOI. See Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947). The exception is obviously limited to securities acquired in pay•
ment of an actual debt. See Blau v. Ogsbury, CCH Fm. SEC. L. REP. 1J 90635 (S,D,N.Y.
1953), afj'd, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954) (no consideration given to the good-faith debt
exception 011- appeal); Kogan v. Schulte, 61 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
102. 352 F.2d at 158.
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Although it might appear that the good-faith debt exception
should therefore be applicable to this situation, there are several
reasons for not allowing insiders holding convertible bonds to make
use of it. In the first place, it is somewhat misleading to characterize
a convertible bond as representing only a debt obligation. In fact,
a convertible bond is a composite of two distinct elements: a debt
obligation and a speculative option permitting the holder to share
in any market appreciation which may result from enhanced earnings prospects.103 Thus, convertible bonds cannot meet the test announced in Rheem, which requires the existence of an obligation
prior to and apart from the settlement that occurs when the stock
is transferred. 104 As the court noted in the Heli-Coil case, a contrary
interpretation would permit widespread abuse of section 16(b), since
nearly all acquisitions of stock can take the form of a contract in
which the seller owes a debt in the form of an obligation to deliver
the stock at some future time, and in which the buyer has a corresponding obligation to pay for the stock in money or other property.105 Moreover, a determination that convertible bonds are not
to be treated as ordinary debts also appears to be consistent with the
over-all design of the Securities Exchange Act, since the statutory
definition of equity securities explicitly includes debentures which
may be converted to common stock.106
A final consideration which suggests that convertible bonds
should not be permitted to come within the good-faith debt exception relates to the observation in the Rheem case that this exemption
was merely intended to make possible the "one-shot settlement of
matured debts." 107 With convertible bonds it is quite clear that
there is no matured debt prior to the due date specified in the indenture agreement. Furthermore, the features of redemption and convertibility totally preclude the generally accepted concept of a
matured debt.108
Ill. CONCLUSION
The all-encompassing interpretations to which the broad language of section 16(b) quite naturally lends itself have been a source
of disquietude since the inception of the Securities Exchange Act. 109
Nevertheless, Congress manifestly intended to deter insider abuse,
and the courts have demonstrated a sense of responsibility in effect103. See generally 1 DEW'ING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 269 (5th ed. 1953).
104. See Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1961).
105. 352 F.2d at 169. Accord, Varian Associates v. Booth, 224 F. Supp. 225, 227 (D.
Mass. 1963), afj'd, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
106. 48 Stat. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(ll) (1964).
107. 295 F.2d at 476.
108. See Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831, 836 (D.N.J. 1963), afl'd,
352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
109. See generally Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MICH. L. REv. 134 (1939).
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ing this policy, even to the extent of consciously imposing a "crushing liability" to serve as a deterrent.110 Indeed, even though the
Securities and Exchange Commission has exercised its expert judgment in certain instances and determined that various transactions
present little possibility for abuse relative to the legitimate function
they serve, 111 the courts have nevertheless invalidated these exemptions if they provide any conceivable unfair advantage.112 This rather
inflexible administration of an admittedly arbitrary statute118 has
given rise to frequent and severe criticism.114
It has recently 9een suggested, however, that the Procrustean
approach manifested in earlier decisions is now largely a historical
phenomenon.115 In particular, there seems to be an increasing tendency to scrutinize the interrelated facts of exchange and conversion
cases,116 which have traditionally involved the greatest conceptual
difficulties in applying the terms "purchase" and "sale." In fact,
prior to Heli-Coil, it appeared that the courts had completely departed from the sweeping rule of liability originally advanced in
the Smolowe case and reiterated in Park b Tilford. Although the
Heli-Coil court was certainly correct in its thesis that the remedial
purposes underlying section 16(b) require a strict, objective standard
of proof, it does not follow that Congress intended the administration of the statute to be purely mechanical in every respect. Indeed,
the weight of authority clearly indicates that the approach must be
pragmatic, not technical,117 and it should be noted that the HeliCoil court did adopt a pragmatic rationale for the consideration of
the good-faith debt exception. It is to be hoped that the courts will
continue to be attentive to an insider's demonstration of functional
reasons why a particular voluntary transaction did not permit any
possibility for ahpse. As the dissent in Heli-Coil pointed out, the
110. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920
(1951).
111. Section 16(b) contains an exemption provision which states that: "This subsection shall not be construed to cover • • • any transaction or transactions which the
commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection." 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
112. See Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957); Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872
(2d Cir. 1949); Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
113. See notes 84 and 85 supra and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1087-90 (2d ed. 1961); Halleran &:
Calderwood, Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution of and Trading in Securities, 28 GEO. WASH, L. REv. 86, 114 (1959).
115. See Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 MICH. L. REv. 649, 678
(1964).
116. See Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct.
180 (1965); Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
961 (1965); '.Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959); Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
117. See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 859
U.S. 927 (1959); .Painter, supra note 115, at 661.
.
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choice is between the majority's "rule of thumb" and "a rule of
reason designed to achieve a result that is both just and respectful
of the legislative language and intendment."118

W. Richard Keller
118. 352 F.2d at 173-74.

